40
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to secure that it shall be composed predominantly of persons specially qualified for their task and of representatives of the central government; and (b) a tendency to replace a number of small, local, autonomous bodies by an authority with wider responsibilities, capable of planning and administering the facilities of a group of ports or docks as a whole. Both these tendencies are in our view deserving of emphasis as correctives of deficiencies which have already emerged in differing degrees at different places, and which it would be dangerous to perpetuate, Without particularising as to individual ports, we may mention some of these deficiencies.
C
It is in general true to say that, if the trust or board is inflated beyond a certain optimum size by the addition of members not directly interested in port administration, the only result is that the work is done by a relatively small number, whose task is rendered the more difficult by the occasional intervention of the passenger" members. We have examined an analysis of the attendances at 14 of the larger port trusts of the United Kingdom, and from this it is plain that the attendances of individual members usually vary inversely with the size of the trust, and that in most instances of the larger trusts a small number of members give regular attendance, while a few are present at only a small proportion of the meetings and cannot be making any valuable contribution to the work of administration. Again, the multiplication of local or sectional interests, each of which is given separate representation on the governing body, is not conducive to the creation of an efficient administration, but tends rather to accentuate local jealousies and to subordinate the general good to temporary sectional compromises.
(127) On the other hand it must be recognised that, particularly in Scot- land, the utmost value attaches to the local patriotisms which have provided the inspiration for many past achievements, and that a strong preference exists for the authority constructed on the representative democratic pattern. On narrower examination we discovered, rather to our surprise, that this preference rested on a theoretical rather than a practical basis; for, notwith- standing the immense elaboration in many of the Clyde local statutes of provisions regulating the franchise and the holding of elections, we found that a contested election to a port authority, or any of the associated bodies, was virtually unknown; that new members owed their position to co-option or nomination, rather than to election in the strict sense; and that, once elected, a member was in practice re-elected as often as he wished.
The system might thus more aptly be described as oligarchic than democratic.
But it was only in one instance that we heard any suggestion that the system on the Clyde had failed to attract the voluntary services of sufficient persons well qualified to serve on the port authorities. In the case of the larger authorities the system has worked well and has afforded scope in many instances for valuable public service. The great danger to be guarded against is that the individual member should consider himself as merely the repre- sentative of some sectional or local interest rather than a member of a team concerned only in advancing a single common purpose.
(128) We append in tabular form a summary of the structure of the governing bodies which before the war controlled a number of leading ports at home and abroad,--not as providing an example necessarily to be followed, since in some instances remodelling is required, but as indicative of recent practice.
Dundee
Glasgow
21
18
22
222
17
4I
Port
Elected Members
Appointed Members
Total
Belfast
I ex officio
10
14 by local authorities
8 by trade associations I by Admiralty
33
18 by local authorities
6 by trade associations
42
Greenock
5 (and 6 representing
stock-holders).
5 by local authority
I independent
Humber
13
4 by local authorities
II by trade associations
37
9 by Government Departments...
9
3 by local authority
3 by trade associations
15
Liverpool
+++
24
4 by Government Departments...
28
18
6 local
4 by Government Departments...}
28
17
17 by local authorities
2 by Government Departments...
36
Leith...
London
Newcastle
Canadian National Harbours Board New South Wales Maritime Services Board Bombay Calcutta
Madras Karachi Rangoon
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Havre (Administrative Council) Antwerp (Port Traffic Commission) Stockholm (Municipal Board)
RECOMMENDATIONS
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(129) The conclusion which in the end of the day we have reached without hesitation is that the time has come for a substantial measure of unification on the Clyde, and that this should be achieved by replacing existing authori- ties in the River and Upper Estuary by a single new authority, to be known as the Clyde Port Authority (or other suitable title) which will exercise the full powers of a modem port and harbour authority within the area above the Cumbrae Heads, and will enjoy certain limited powers in the lower Estuary. We contemplate that this new authority will, either at once or after an interval, acquire the assets and assume the liabilities of the existing undertakings (with certain exceptions), and will be charged with the duty of maintaining improving and developing the river and estuary and their navi- gational potentialities in the general interests of the West of Scotland and of the country as a whole, collaborating so far as practicable with the central and local authorties and inland transport undertakers in all schemes for the improvement, expansion and re-development of the industrial hinterland served by the Clyde.
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